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PHYSICIAN LIABILITY AND MANAGED CARE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Dionne Koller Fine *
INTRODUCTION

Rapid and far-reaching changes in health-care delivery have
reshaped the way the physician practices medicine. Often, the
physician's legal and ethical obligations to provide care are in direct
conflict with society's push to limit its cost. l On the one hand, the
physician must adhere to the law and the medical profession's code
of ethics, which generally dictate that the individual patient's needs
should come first? On the other hand, unlike the passive third-party
payer of the past, managed care organizations (MeOs) seek to control
health care costs by controlling physicians' utilization and provision
of health care services. 3 The reality of a physician's participation
* Dionne Koller Fine is Assistant Director for Academic Achievement and Lecturer, University of
Maryland School of Law. B.A., cum laude, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D., with honors,
George Washington University Law School; M.A., George Washington University.
\. See generally Robert I. Field, New Ethical Relationships Under Health Care's New Structure:
The Needfora New Paradigm, 43 VD..L. L REV. 467 (1998).
2. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed to
Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L.REV. 1809, 183940 (1992).
3. See BARRY R. FuRROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAw, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, vol. 1, chs. I11,289-90 (West Group 2d ed. 2000).
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with a managed care plan is that she simply must ration care.
The liability standards applied to physicians have largely remained
unchanged despite the drastic change in the role of the third-party
payer in the physician-patient relationship. Courts continue to rely on
traditional formulations of physicians' duties in malpractice cases,
and Congress and the states have focused on passing targeted
legislation aimed at ensuring that MCOs' overriding interest in
controlling costs does not subvert patient care. 4 The physician is
caught in the middle, and this catch-22 presents a significant policy
problem.
The specific policy problem grows out of this tension between the
physician's legal and ethical obligations and the requirements
imposed on the physician by managed health care. The problem
manifests itself in two distinct ways. First, and most directly, the
issue confronts the physician in the context of malpractice liability.
Unlike the fee-for-service system, in which physicians enjoyed
almost complete autonomy over patient care, MCOs now impose on
physicians a significant amount of direct and indirect control over the
way they practice medicine. This control often forces physicians to
ration care. Although in many cases rationing at the bedside may
result in eliminating arguably unnecessary health care, frequently it
involves limiting care that may be beneficial and within the current
standard of care. Such rationing subjects the physician to malpractice
liability risks. Current medical malpractice law enhances this risk
because the standard of care not only rejects the notion of rationing or
cost-control as a defense, it also speaks frequently of the physician
having a duty to resist being tainted by the pressures of managed
health care and cost containment.
The second manifestation of the policy problem grows out of the
first and involves physicians' vulnerability in their relationship with a
managed care plan. Physicians' contracts with third-party payers
have a central role in the way they practice medicine. Such contracts
commonly provide that physicians who do not control costs in
4. Catherine M. Hedgeman, The Rationing of Medicine: Herdrich v. Pegram, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 305, 306-08 (2000).
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accordance with an MeO's cost-containment policies face
deselection or termination from the plan. Such an outcome could
seriously injure or even destroy physician practices.
This article examines these issues and potential solutions using a
philosophical framework. Such an approach will demonstrate that
significant ethical issues arise when physicians dispense managed
health care within the current liability framework. The problems
discussed here do not simply affect individual patients, but physicians
and society at large. Such issues must not be ignored when
policymakers craft health care reform initiatives.
Part I of this article describes the traditional fee-for-service model
of health-care delivery and the current managed care system. Part IT
explains the legal framework in which physicians practice medicine.
Part ill of this article asserts that the law's failure to account for the
change to managed care and the resulting change in the way
physicians practice medicine has created a situation that is
fundamentally unfair to physicians. The law holds the physician to a
fee-for-service level of care, which generally rejects considerations of
costs, while physicians' obligations to MeOs often require that they
ration care. MeOs, with their market power and ability to set the
terms of contracts with participating physicians, are able to terminate
physicians who do not sufficiently contain costs, often with little
notice. This section argues that the continued adherence to outdated
principles of liability is deficient from a utilitarian perspective. The
current legal framework does not further society's overall goal of
lowering health care costs.
Finally, Part IV of this article discusses the possible solutions to
this policy problem such as federal and state legislation that would
impose greater liability on Meos and leave physicians' legal
obligations in place. This section evaluates proposed solutions and
identifies the ethical strengths and weaknesses of each. The article
concludes that the superior solution is one that relies on the
profession itself to mitigate the unfairness and address the utilitarian
concerns posed by the policy problem. This solution draws on
existing legal rules, which give great deference to the medical
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profession to set its own standards in malpractice cases. The solution
envisions a proactive role for the profession and suggests that such an
approach is in fact morally required.

II. THE FEE-FaR-SERVICE AND MANAGED CARE MODELS
To understand the ethical implications of the physician's current
role in delivering health care services, it is important to understand
the fee-for-service and managed care models. Generally speaking,
the fee-for-service model is based on principles of physician fidelity
and patient autonomy. At its best, the model reflects the notion that
every individual, at least every insured individual, is entitled to all
medical care that could be beneficial, regardless of how much the
care might cost. 5 Therefore, the physician's interest and patient's
interest are aligned to provide as much health care as could possibly
be of benefit.
The managed care model does not focus on what is best for
individual patients, but instead on what is best for society. As society
cannot support dramatically escalating health care costs, the managed
. care system draws its moral strength from its ability to control these
costs and therefore ensure that health care remains affordable for the
largest number of individuals. At its best, the model reflects the
notion that much of the health care currently being delivered is
wasteful and unnecessary. By weeding out the waste, the hope is that
managed care will not only control costs, but also improve care.
A. The Fee-for-Service Model

The fee-for-service model is one where physicians are paid on a
retrospective basis, and in full, for all "medically necessary" services
Traditionally, the physician alone
provided to the patient. 6
determined what services were medically necessary. Therefore,
"physician income is directly proportional to the billing generated by
5. See

MARK

HAll..

MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAw, ETHICS, AND EcONOMICS

(Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
6. See Field. supra note I, at 468-69.

OF RATIONING MECHANISMS

2003]

PHYSICIAN LIABILITY AND MANAGED CARE

645

services rendered to patients.,,7 Third-party payers had no role in the
physician-patient relationship. 8 . As a result, no financial or other
incentives in the model encourage physicians to limit care. 9
Significantly, critics noted that, because of the lack of any oversight
over physicians, they had no incentive to consider the costs of the
services they provided, and indeed, the system actually encouraged
physicians to provide unnecessary or marginally beneficial care. JO
The fee-for-service model did not incorporate the view that doctors
needed to or should control health-care costs.
1. Ethical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Fee-for-Service Model

The fee-for-service model is based on the ethical duty of absolute
fidelity to the patient, which requires physicians to work in the
interests of their patients first and foremost, even over their own
personal interest. ll Therefore, the physician's interests generally
align with those of her patient. The fee-for-service system reinforced
this ethic by "exclud[ing] outside influences from the doctor-patient
relationship, enabling physicians to devote [their] full attention to
patients.,,12 Accordingly, the fee-for-service system isolated the
treatment relationship from the workings of the market. Only
physicians were subject to financial incentives, and the incentive was
not to withhold care. It was traditionally held that physicians could
counter this inducement with ethics. 13 The model draws moral
strength from the egalitarian principle that individuals are entitled to
the best care, regardless of its cost. At its best, the fee-for-service
model honors the dignity of individuals and value of all human life
because cost is generally not a consideration in determining the care
that should be delivered.
7. Daniel P. Sulmasy. Physicians. Cost Control. and Ethics. in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED
CARE 155. 166 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eels.) 1997).

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 469-70.
II. See TROYEN BRENNAN. JUST DOCTORING: MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE UBERALSTATE 35 (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1991).
12. See BRENNAN. supra note II. at 32.
13. See id. at 33.
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However, the fee-for-service system is not without ethical
weakness. The underlying assumption of the fee-for-service system
is that "physicians are morally superior people.,,14 In fact, the power
the physician has over the patient, the nature of greater knowledge,
and the ability to dictate the terms and course of treatment, provide
the possibility the physician will "exploit patients' vulnerability.,,15
Therefore, the fee-for-service model can encourage over-treatment,
which aside from its costs, holds significant physical risks~
[I]t is a well-documented fact that the sanctity of the ideal
patient-physician relationship in fee-for-service arrangements
has been overestimated. Under that model, financial conflicts of
interest among medical professionals also existed. However,
doctors could more easily hide financially motivated behavior
since their interests were often aligned with those of their
patients. 16
Perhaps the chief weakness of the fee-for-service system is that it
overlooks society's need to control health care costs and instead
focuses on providing individual patients with all treatment that could
possibly be beneficial. 17 Because resources that can be devoted to
health care are finite, however, the fee-for-service system is selfdestructing. 18 Some scholars argue the ethically su'perior approach,
therefore, is an approach that takes account of what is best for
society, and therefore the greatest number of individuals. 19

14. KENMAN WONG, MEDICINE AND THE MARKETPLACE 65 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998).
Wong asserts that "the belief that. as a profession, physicians can be completely trusted as the exclusive
guardians of the health of patients is one that should be held loosely." [d.
15. E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW
EcONOMICS 44 (Georgetown Univ. Press 1995).
16. WONG, supra note 14, at 67.
17. HALL, supra note 5, at 131.
18. [d. at 131-32.
19. See id. at 130-33.
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C. The Managed Care Model
Managed care attempts to control health care costs by controlling
physician behavior and limiting patients' utilization of services
through a variety of techniques. 2o Therefore the term managed care
"can be used to include virtually any financing arrangement where
there is third-party management or supervision that attempts in some
structured way to oversee quality and, particularly, the costs of
services delivered to the plan's beneficiaries.,,21 Courts have noted
that MCOs often wear two hats, providing administrative support for
an insurance plan, including making determinations of eligibility or
coverage, and acting "as an arranger and provider of medical
treatment.,,22 Therefore, MCOs integrate financing and delivery of
health care. Managed care encompasses many different types of
health care delivery structures, including Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs),
and Independent Practice Associations (IPAs).
The principles
underlying the different managed care structures, however, are the
same.
MCOs use many techniques to force physicians and patients to
consider the costs of care. 23 For instance, MCOs often require preauthorization for certain services, restrict access to specialists, deny
payment for services provided outside of their provider "network,"
and .restrict coverage for prescription drugs. Many MCOs pay
physicians on a capitated basis, whereby physicians agree to receive a·
fixed monthly fee per enrolled patient from the MCO, regardless of
what services patients ultimately need and receive. 24 MCOs also
frequently offer participating physicians bonus incentives tied to
certain utilization levels. 25
One of an MCO's primary cost containment tools is utilization
20. See John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient
Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1397, 1402, 1478 (1997).
21. KENNETH R. WING, ET AL., THE LAw AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 84 (Aspen Law & Business

1998).
22. Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000).
23. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 290, 404.
24. See id. at 399-400.
25. See id. at 400.
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review, which "is designed to evaluate the medical necessity and
appropriateness of health services from the payer's perspective, in
light of norms of acceptable practice.,,26 Utilization review is "based
on two assumptions': that there are wide variations in the use of many
. medical services; and that careful review of medical care can
eliminate wasteful, unnecessary care or harmful care.,,27 It mainly
consists of prior review, before services are delivered, and concurrent
Prior review includes "prereview and case management. 28
admission review" before hospitalization for elective procedures,
"admission review" for emergency admissions, review during
hospital admission to determine the length of stay, and "preprocedure review" to determine the appropriateness of certain
recommended procedures. 29 In addition to these techniques for
standard plan participants, MeOs have case managers who closely
monitor treatment for high-cost plan members suffering from costly
or chronic conditions. 3o
D. Ethical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Managed Care Model

The managed care model purportedly recognizes that society's
health care resources are scarce. 31 It is not self-destructing, as the
fee-for-service model is said to be, but will in fact sustain the level of
quality health care with which we are accustomed while promoting
the societal goal of reducing costs. 32 The concern for costs, in this
view, gives managed care an ethical edge over fee-for-service
medicine in that it does not consider individuals at the expense of
society. 33 Society benefits because more individuals will be able to
obtain care.
The primary ethical objection to managed care is that the cost26. [d. at 414.
27. [d.
28. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 415.
29. [d. at 45.
30. [d.
31. See Nonnan Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States [s So Hard,.in CHOICES
AND CONFLICT: EXPLORAnONS IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS 57 (Emily Friedman ed., 1992).
32. See HALL, supra note 5, at 132.

33. See id.
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containment strategies that MCOs commonly employ alter the
traditional physician-patient relationship.34
Critics assert that
physicians can no longer exclusively act as the patient's advocate and
consider the patient's needs without regard to considerations of
35 Because of the structure of many MCO-physician contracts,
COSt.
physicians' incomes are put in conflict with the well-being of their
patients. 36 Critics also assert that MCOs induce physicians to deny
necessary treatment, unlike the fee-for-service model. 37 Accordingly,
MCOs force physician!; to ration care at the bedside, a role critics
point out is unethical. 38 An additional ethical problem stems from
the fact that MCOs are for-profit enterprises. "These institutions
have conflicting roles in their attempt to function both as traditional
businesses, which have financial obligations to shareholders, and as
medical entities, which have duties to uphold the best interests of
patients.,,39 The emphasis on the bottom line provides a strong
incentive for such companies to enroll only healthy participants, who
are likely to have lower health care costs, and avoid enrolling
chronically ill or disabled individuals. 4o Commentators refer to this
incentive as "cream skimming," and it raises significant issues
regarding health care coverage options for the most vulnerable
members of society.41 Additionally, MCOs lack organizational ethics
that would draw from work that has been done in corporate ethics. 42
As MCOs continue to grow, there must be some investigation and
development of organizational ethics in light of the tension between
the MCO's for-profit status and the patient-centered ethic of
medicine: 43

34. See Field, supra note I, at 478.
35. See id. at 478-79; Andrea K. Marsh, Sacrificing Patients for Profits: Physician Incentives to
Limit Care and ERISA Fiduciary Duty, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1323-24 (1999).
36. See Sulmasy, supra note 7, at 160-61.
37. See Marsh, supra note 35, at 1324.
38. See HALL, supra note 5, at 114.
39. WONG, supra note 14, at I.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id. at 66-67.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 5.
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E. The Two Models and Health Care Rationing
The two models of health care delivery outlined above ultimately
diverge on the issue of health care rationing. The fee-for-service
model explicitly rejects rationing as unethical. 44 In contrast, the
managed care model embraces certain rationing techniques and, in
many cases, requires physicians to ration care.45 A policy problem
emerges as the law, to a great extent, sanctions rationing by MeOs,
but forbids it' by physicians. "Despite consensus among most experts
that health care costs must be contained, great controversy surrounds
whether it is ever acceptable to ration health care.'.46
F. Rationing and Patients
A popular misconception about health care is that more care is
better than less. 47 Some scholars note that the demand for health care
is "virtually unlimited. ,.48 A related belief, sometimes referred to by
scholars as our "medical egalitarianism," is that society is unwilling
to accept that some people are not entitled to at least a minimum level
of health care due to their inability to pay.49
[W]e are libertarians to the extent that we leave individuals free
for the most part to engage in highly risky behavior, but our
humanitarian and egalitarian values come to the forefront when
we observe people who are actively suffering from whatever
causes, including their own improvidence . . . . This strong
rescue ethic . . . means that our society will care for people in
serious and obvious distress regardless of whether they can

44. See Field, supra note
45. See id. at 473.

46.

1, at 469.

PETER USEL, PRICING LIFE: WHY IT'S TIME FOR HEALTH CARE RATIONING

11

(MIT Press

2(00).

47. WILLIAM I. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 9 (5th ed.
48. [d. at Ill.

1998).

49. PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE
(Oxford Univ. Press 1990).

116-17
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pay.50
These beliefs no doubt underlie the backlash against managed care.
Although individuals want to control health care costs, they do not
want to sacrifice the type or amount of care they can access. The law
has not accepted such sacrifices either.
G. Rationing and Physicians

Patients' reluctance to cut back when it comes to their own care is
likely a learned response to years of fee-for-service medicine and the
The medical
fee-for-service ethic of the medical profession.
profession has long held that the physician's individual patient must
always come first, and considerations of cost should never be part of
the treatment relationship.51 Physicians have an "ethic of absolute
quality;" in the physician's view, "literally any marginal medical
benefit, no matter how small, is worth absolutely any price because
we want doctors in their role as healers to behave as if each of our
lives is priceless.,,52 Therefore, most physicians and other experts are
opposed to care rationing because it violates commonly understood
physician duties to their patients and therefore erodes the trust that is
the foundation of the physician-patient relationship.53 Moreover,
physicians often assert that they are simply not trained to ration care,
which creates the possibility that they will not ration fairly. 54
Physicians find rationing difficult because "providers cannot
appeal to the justice of their denial;,,55 in other words, there is no
clear connection between the resources saved when health care is
limited for one patient and resources spent on others. 56 Physicians
have no guarantee that their bedside rationing will result in better
health care, only that, in general, they are helping to reduce the
50. HALL, supra note 5, at 32.
51. See BRENNAN, supra note 11, at 48.
52. HALL, supra note 5, at 115.
53. See USEL, supra note 46, at 109.
54. See USEL, supra note 46, at 109.
55. Daniels, supra note 31, at 59.
56. [d.
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pressure of growing health care costS. 57 Therefore, physicians have
no greater ethic to follow than their own professional ethic, which
mandates that the patient always comes first. 58 Ethical beliefs and
professional norms often lead physicians to avoid rationing imposed
by MeOs at all costs. Indeed, citing their ethic of fidelity to their
patients, a large number of physicians have indicated that they have
or would submit inaccurate billing statements to insurers in an
attempt to secure for their patients what they believe to be necessary
medical care. 59
Despite this seemingly categorical opposition to care rationing,
bedside rationing in fact is part of many physician-patient
relationships, although physicians likely will not admit it. 6o "[I]n the
current health care environment, most clinicians have been taught
that [rationing] is immoral. Thus, they rely on euphemisms
without having to acknowledge that they are rationing.,,61
H. Rationing, the Law, and Managed Care

From a legal perspective, not all health care rationing is
impermissible. For the most part, the law does not prevent the type
of implicit rationing by the free market that regularly occurs in our
society. Although federal law does require emergency departments to
initially screen and stabilize all patients who present themselves for
treatment,62 nothing in the law requires physicians to accept patients
who cannot pay.63 The law also permits the explicit rationing
involved in coverage determinations, such as scrutinizing requested
services to make sure they fall within the scope of covered

57. Id.

at 89.
59. Victor G. Freeman, Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 159 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 2263, 2263 (1999).
60. USEL, supra note 46, at 137.
61. Id. Ubel states that bedside rationing is "ubiquitous." Id. He gives the example of an
orthopedic surgeon repairing an elderly individual's hip. Id. Ubel notes that the surgeon will choose a
less expensive and lower-quality hardware for the procedure based on the patient's life expectancy. [d.
at 111.
62. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1395dd (2001).
63. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1840.
58. Id.
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circumstances. 64 The law draws the line on rationing, however, when
"it affects the recommendations for care made by the physician.,,65
Therefore, under current malpractice law, physicians cannot make
treatment recommendations that deny patients beneficial care. There
is "unanimity' between ethical and legal communities in their
opposition to bedside rationing.,,66 As mentioned above, rationing is
central to managed health care, and has been accepted on some level
as necessary to control health care costs. Much of the recent law
involving managed care reflects the conflict over whether rationing is
necessary or acceptable. 67 In cases involving MCOs, courts uphold
the utilization review and incentive structures that are key to
controlling physician behavior, which effectively require physicians
to ration care. 68 Cases against physicians, however, do not openly
embrace these principles.
This article assumes that some form of health care rationing is
necessary and even inevitable. 69 It also assumes that managed care
adopts a system of implicit rationing, whereby physicians cut back on
the treatment they provide at the bedside. As discussed below, the
law should sanction implicit rationing as part of a policy solution to
mitigate the unfairness to physicians currently caught in the middle of
managed care's drive for cost-containment, as well as to better
promote society's goals of reducing overall health care costs.

n. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE PHYSICIAN PRACTICES
MEDICINE

To evaluate whether the current liability framework affecting
physicians is fair (and justified from a utilitarian perspective), it is
important to keep in mind key areas of the law that have an impact on
the physician. This discussion of the legal framework is intended as a
brief review and only presents the issues to the extent they are
64. See Pegram v. Herdrich. 530 U.S. 211. 219 (2000).
65. See Hirshfe1d. supra note 2. at 1841.
66. HALL. supra note 5. at 117.
67. See. e.g .• Pegram. 530 U.S. at 22'1.
68. See. e.g .• id. at 219.
69. See generally HALL. supra note 5:
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relevant to evaluating the policy problem and potential solutions.
A. Medical Ethics

Although principles of medical ethics do not have the force of law,
the physician's ethical framework is important because the law
reflects these ethics and they are indeed the backbone of many of the
physician's legal obligations. 7o The concept of medical ethics began
with the Hippocratic Oath. Medical ethics then grew out of "[t]he
variety of codes, essays by physicians, theologians,· and
philosophers," whose writings had a common thread-physicians'
responsibility to their patients. 71 Therefore, "a physician is said to act
morally when he or she places the patient's welfare above all other
considerations.,,72 Medical ethics continuously evolved until 1912,
around which time "the emphasis on patient trust, doctor control, and
economic noninterference was institutionalized.'.73 These ethical
principles are demonstrated by the method with which health
insurance traditionally was structured, as well as in physicians' legal
obligations to their patients. 74 "[T]he [c]ommitment to the patient is .
. . nourished by a wealth of themes and images deeply embedded in
medical culture.,,75 Indeed, these images are also embedded in the
legal culture that developed around modem medicine.
B. Fiduciary Duties

Legally, physicians have a fiduciary relationship with their
patients. 76 The patient, who is in a vulnerable state, places his trust
and confidence in the physician who, due to her training and
experience, has vastly superior knowledge of the patient's condition
70. See generally BRENNAN. supra note 11.
71. [d. at 33.
72. [d.
73. [d. at 32.
74. See generally id. at 44-45.
75. See MENZEL. supra note 49. at 4.
76. In this relationship. "trust and confidence are reposed by one party in the influence or
dominance of another. creating in the latter a duty to act with greater diligence and care than that
required by a common negligence standard of due care." See MORREIM. supra note 15. at 44; Neade v.
Portes. 739 N.E.2d 496. 500 (TIl. 2000).
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and options for care. 77 This relationship requires fidelity, and as
such, physicians "must be dedicated to serving their patients'
interests, even above their own.,,78 Therefore, in imposing fiduciary
duties on physicians, the legal system incorporates the medical
profession's own standard of placing the patient first.
From the fiduciary nature of the relationship, the law derives
several duties that it imposes on physicians, including the duty to
maintain confidentiality, avoid conflicts of interest, and secure
informed consent from the patient. 79 The law that has developed in
the area of informed consent is a good example of the way in which
the law defers to or incorporates the standards of the medical
profession. In cases brought by patients alleging that the physician
administered treatment without informed consent, the standard
applied by the majority of states is whether the physician disclosed
information that the reasonable, prudent physician would disclose to
a patient under similar circumstances. 8o This view rejects the other
standard, applied by' a handful' of jurisdictions, requiring the
physician to disclose what, in the physician's view, the reasonable
patient would need to know to make an informed decision as to
whether to proceed with treatment. 81 The majority view is that
physicians should not have to be "mind readers" to determine what a
patient would need to know before deciding to undergo treatment. 82
Therefore, courts in informed consent cases defer to what the medical
profession thinks patients need to know as opposed to what a patient
believes she would need or want to know. 83 The implications of the
law's deference to the standards of the medical profession will be
discussed below with respect to the optimal policy solution.

77. See MORREIM. supra note

15, at 44'.

78. [d. at 44.

79. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3at 150. 315.
80. See Culbertson v. Memitz. 602 N.E.2d 98.100 (Ind.

81.

[d. at
82. [d. at
83. [d. at

100-01.
103.
100.

1992).
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C. Malpractice
Malpractice law is another area where the law has incorporated the
standards of the medical profession. In the usual negligence case, the
jury decides whether the defendant's conduct was appropriate with
reference to how a "reasonable person" would have acted in similar
circumstances. Courts, however, decide medical negligence very
differently. The prevailing belief is that the jury lacks sufficient
knowledge and training to determine whether a physician's actions in
treating a patient were reasonable. 84 Juries, therefore, evaluate a
physician's actions in a particular case not by what the jury believes
is right or "reasonable," as in ordinary cases, but by the custom or
standard of care that prevails in the medical profession. Unlike other
negligence claims, "[t]he standards for evaluating the delivery of
professional medical services are not normally established by either
[the] judge or jury. The medical profession itself sets the standards of
practice and the courts enforce these standards .... ,,85
Drawing on general principles of negligence, medical malpractice
is defined as "a failure to exercise the 'required degree of care, skill
and diligence' under the circumstances," which failure causes injury
to the patient. 86 Courts determine the standard of care by which to
measure a physician's negligence with reference to the level of skill
and knowledge that a reasonable physician should possess,
considering the facilities and equipment available in that physician's
locality.87 The particular standard of care that is ultimately applied in
a malpractice suit is derived from leaders in the medical profession
and the interaction of physicians through peer-reviewed journals and
professional meetings. 88 These standards often account for different
practice styles and expectations that frequently exist in different
Recently, physicians' groups have
regions of the country.89
developed practice guidelines for various specialties, which parties to
84. See FuRROW. ET AL., supra note 3, at
85. [d.
86. [d. at

269.

270.

87. See id. at 269, 470.
88. [d. at 271.
89. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 271.
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a suit can use as evidence in determining whether a physician
exercised due care. 90 The usefulness of such guidelines in fashioning
a solution to the policy problem 'will be outlined below. Most courts
"give professional medical standards conclusive weight, so that the
trier of fact is not allowed to reject the practice as improper.,,91
Notably, physicians cannot assert as a defense to a malpractice action
that they were under pressure from a managed care organization to
delay or limit care.
With the rise of managed care has come a new twist on malpractice
liability. Recent malpractice cases are premised not simply on
medical mistake, but on the fact that in rendering treatment, the
pressure to ration care corrupted or tainted the physician's
judgment. 92 Although punitive damages are relatively rare in
malpractice cases, "[t]he potential for punitive damages may be
vastly heightened as juries increasingly begin to learn of the financial
incentives that HMOs and other forms of constrained insurance create
for doctors to minimize treatment costs. ,,93 As will be discussed
below, this liability has important fairness and utilitarian implications
that define the policy problem and support the need for a policy
response.
D. Contract Law
Contract law previously had little to do with the relationship
94
between physicians and insurers or third-party payers.
Traditionally, health insurance contracts "incorporate[d] by reference
the norms and standards of the medical profession. ,,95 Payer and
provider obligations in such contracts were defined exclusively by
physicians and insurance contracts typically agreed to provide

90. [d.

91.
ETHICS

at 271-72.

Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses,

28, 31 (2001).

29 1. L. MED. &

92. See CLARK C. HA VIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIV ATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
112 (AEI Press 1995).
93. WILLIAM 1. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 331 (5th ed. 1998).
94. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 92, at 110.
95. See id. at 112.
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payment for health care services that were "medically necessary.,,96
Only the physician, subject to certain ethical and legal constraints,
would define what was and was not medically necessary.97 Given
that the medical profession specifically rejects considerations of cost
as part of determining what is' medically necessary, traditional health
insurance contracts effectively contained no provision for rationing
care. 98 In addition, by incorporating professional norms into
traditional insurance contracts, these contracts reflected the medical
profession's requirement that third-party payers had no place in the
treatment relationship.99 To physicians, contracts had little to do with
the way they practiced medicine.
However, the development of managed care has given contracts a
much more central role in both the physician-payer relationship and
the physician-patient relationship.loo
First, although "medical
necessity" may still be a necessary benchmark for whether a health
plan will pay for services, it is no longer sufficient. 101 In addition,
contract law has become an important part of the delivery of health
care partly because managed care has penetrated to such a level that
most physicians now must participate in a managed care plan to keep
their practices viable. 102 MeOs are able then to use this power to
require physicians to adhere to standard form contracts that contain
many provisions that are not only friendly to the MeO, but also
directly affect the way in which the physician practices medicine. 103
Therefore, Meos have successfully drawn on contract law and used
it as part of their strategy to control the physician's delivery of health
care services. 104 For example, standard managed care contracts
typically contain "hold harmless" clauses in which MeOs attempt to
shift liability for poor patient outcomes to the participating
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

[d. at 112. 125.
See id. at 125-26.
[d. at 112. 125.
[d. at 112.
See Little. supra note 20. at 1405.
See HAVIGHURST. supra note 92. at 125-26.
See Little. supra note 20. at 1405.
[d. at 1402. 1407.
[d. at 1407.
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physicians, even if the patient's injury can be attributed to the MCO's
denying authorization for, delaying, or otherwise not covering a
physician's recommended procedure or plan of treatment. 105 In
addition, standard managed care contracts typically contain the terms
of both negative and positive financial incentives for physicians to
limit care. 106 Finally, one of the most significant provisions
contained in most standard MCO contracts allows the MCO to
terminate the physician from the managed care plan with little notice
or opportunity for a hearing if the physician does not sufficiently
comply with the MCO's cost-containment strategies. 107 Though once
of little consequence, contract law now clearly provides a powerful
vehicle for implementing MCO's cost-containment strategies by
providing the means to control physician behavior and shaping how
medical treatment is delivered.
E. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

"The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
is undoubtedly the most influential statute affecting the financing of
health care in the United States."IOS Despite this fact, Congress did
not intend for ERISA necessarily to deal with health care financing,
but instead passed it, long before managed care, in response to reports
of fraud and mismanagement of employee retirement funds. 109
Congress primarily intended to safeguard employee pensions by
regulating employee benefit plans. 110 Because ERISA applies to all
employee benefit plans, however, it covers employer-provided health'
insurance. "ERISA plans are now the leading source of payment for
health services nationwide, with more than seventy five percent of all
managed care plans ERISA-qualified." 111
ERISA has a significant effect on health benefit plans by providing
105.
106.
107.
lOS.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1400-01.
FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 423.

109. [d. at 424.

110. [d.
111. [d. at 441.
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substantial protection to MCOs.
ERISA itself imposes few requirements on employee health
benefit plans, and provides minimal remedies for employees
who are adversely affected by health plan decisions. On the
other hand, ERISA preempts a wide range of state laws and
remedies intended to protect health plan beneficiaries, often
leaving plan beneficiaries wholly stripped of legal protection
from health plan abuses. I 12

ERISA has this impact for several reasons. First, the Act expressly
preempts "any state law which 'relates to' an employee benefit
plan." II 3 This preemption is significant because it has left states
unable to significantly regulate MCOs and has left plan participants
with limited or no remedies against such plans. I 14 "As ERISA does
not itself regulate or provide remedies against health plans except to a
very limited extent, ERISA preemption generally results in a
regulatory and liability vacuum, allowing health plans to behave as
they choose with little accountability to their members or to the
public." I 15
Second, ERISA not only preempts state law relating to employee
benefit plans, but also has been interpreted to preempt state
jurisdiction and remedies with respect to employee health benefit
plans. 116 Because state jurisdiction, substantive law, and remedies are
all preempted, a plaintiff injured by a health benefit plan must bring
suit in federal court, and may only recover the benefits due to her
under the terms of the plan. ERISA does not allow recovery of
compensatory or punitive damages to compensate a plan participant
for injuries and, therefore, restricts substantially the amount of
recovery possible in what would be an ordinary tort case. 117
In the early years of managed care, ERISA was used successfully
112. [d. at 424.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2002); see also FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 424.
114. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 424.
lIS. [d. at 429.
116. [d.
117. [d. at 442.
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to provide nearly complete protection from tort liability for managed
care plans. 118 Recently, however, some federal courts have limited
this preemption, finding that many tort claims have little impact on
the administration of an employee benefit plan. I 19 However, for the
most part, courts have continued to interpret ERISA preemption
broadly, holding in most cases that state laws regulating insurance
and managed care "relate to" an ERISA plan and are therefore
preempted. 120 MCas therefore have been able to continue to use
ERISA preemption to severely limit the remedies available to
plaintiffs who claim MCa negligence. Despite some recent cases
holding that ERISA preemption does not apply to some types of
MCa conduct,121 the Act remains a formidable defense for managed
care plans.
F. Managed Care Legislation

The legal framework surrounding managed care is a work in
progress; In addition to triggering new applications of existing law,
managed care has been the subject of numerous legislative initiatives
at both the federal and state levels. Indeed, more than 1,000 bills
were introduced in response to public outrage over managed care
from 1995 through 1997. 122 Significantly, none of these laws permit
physicians to ration health care.
Commentator David Hyman gives an overview of managed care
legislation by dividing the measures into two categories. 123 He
describes Type I as "provisions which affect the relationship between
health care providers and managed care organizations" and Type IT as
"provisions which affect the relationship between health care
providers and patients, including the scope of covered services.,,124
118. See id. at 430-31.
119. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 432.
120. [d. at 433.
121. See, e.g., Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that ERISA does not preempt state provisions imposing liability on HMOs).
122. David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: With Friends Like These . .. , in
HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK 286 (Alice Grossfield ed.• West 1998).
123. See id. at 286-87.
124. [d.
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Examples of Type I legislation include "any willing provider" state
laws, which restrict the ability of MCOs to contract with whichever
physicians they choose; contain due process provisions; and prohibit
"gag" clauses that prevent the physician from discussing with the
patient treatment options that the plan does not cover or authorize. 125
Examples of Type IT legislation include "consumer protection"
measures that ensure direct access to some specialists; mandatory
coverage of certain procedures such as reasonable emergency room
visits; and forty-eight hour hospital stays after childbirth. 126 In
addition, many states have mandated external appeals of coverage
denials. 127 Some states have passed comprehensive regulatory
schemes. 128 . As discussed above, ERISA has limited to a great extent
these state reform efforts through preemption.
On the federal level, several proposals, some in the form of a
"Patients' Bill of Rights," would provide individuals, along with
other protections, a right to sue MCOs and thereby effectively
eliminate the ERISA protections MCOs now enjoy.129 These targeted
federal and state initiatives, while somewhat helpful, do not fully
alleviate the effects of the policy problem.

m. THE POLICY PROBLEM
The policy problem is a general one, but with very specific effects.
This article assumes. as a starting point. that society must control
health care costs. The policy problem stems from the fact that the .
rules that have an impact on the way physicians practice medicine
reflect an era in which fee-for-service medicine predominated. and
the physician operated with nearly complete autonomy. including the
freedom to ignore costs. 130 The shift to managed care, with its
significant third-party payer role in the treatment relationship, does
more than simply add a layer of accountability to health care delivery.
125. See id. at 287.
126. [d. at 288.
127. Hyman. supra note 122. at 289.
128. [d. at 287; see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 88.0001 et seq.
129. See Hyman. supra note 122. at 289.
130. See supra Part II.
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Managed care fundamentally changes a physician's obligations and
incentives with respect to providing health care and also puts in direct
conflict the physician's traditional ethical and legal obligations
toward her patient and the physician's obligation to control health
care costS. 131
A. The General Policy Problem
Health care scholars Mark Hall and Haavi Morreim have discussed
this general policy problem in detail. Hall notes that managed health
care requires physicians to ration at the bedside because MCOs
reward physicians for cutting costs in delivering health cOare and
penalizes them in various ways for spending more on health care
delivery than the MCO has determined is an appropriate level. 132 He
explains, however, that the dominant view is that there is an absolute
moral prohibition against physicians considering the costs of
treatment. 133 This moral prohibition is reflected in physicians' ethics
as well as in writings by a variety of health care scholars about the
physician-patient relationship.134 Hall explains that the law strongly
disfavors physicians making medical spending decisions or
rationing. 135
Hall supports this assertion by detailing research he conducted
reviewing all judicial opinions on health insurance for the past thirtyfive years that involved a question as to whether a proposed treatment
was medically appropriate and therefore should be covered by
insurance.136 He concluded that both public and private insurers lost
nearly 60% of the coverage denials that they sought to uphold in
court, and courts found few factors that would affect an insurer's
success in having the denial sustained. 137 In addition, Hall found that
judicial review of proposed coverage denials was most stringent
131.

See HALL, supra note 5. at
132. See id. at 114.
133. See id. at 115.
134. [d. at 114-15.
135. [d. at 115-16.
136. [d. at 68.
137. HALL supra note 5 at 68.
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when courts suspected that an economic motivation, and not the lack
of medical justification, was the reason behind the denial of
coverage. 138 Hall notes that in such instances, courts "see a profitmaking insurer who has already received its premium refusing to
honor reasonable treatment requests by a sick patient.,,139 Other types
of health-care cases also demonstrate the preference for providing all
beneficial care, regardless of cost. 140
Hall asserts that this preference no longer makes sense, that current
legal rules disfavoring, even prohibiting, health 'care rationing by
physicians are "out of step with current economic and medical
realities." 141 Indeed, it is not just that the law fails to reflect current
realities, but that the failure to reflect these realities and allow for
rationing is a significant moral issue. 142 H~ll argues that "the fact
that a number of thoughtful physicians and patients feel strongly and
sincerely about the moral degeneracy of HMOs provides no basis for
framing those personal beliefs in absolutist or categorical ethical
terms.,,143 Physicians' ethical requirement to provide patients with all
care that could possibly be of benefit, regardless of cost, and the
demise of the fee-for-service system and subsequent rise of managed
health care clearly illustrates, according to Hall, the contingency of
moral values. 144 Viewed in this way, the physician's ethic to provide
all care "is an idiosyncratic artifact of the culture of attitudes and
behavior generated by outmoded forms of insurance.,,145 Requiring
physicians to provide all potentially beneficial health care, while
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g.,

In re Baby K. 16 F.3d 590,598 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the hospital must provide
care to anencephalic infant, where mother requested it, despite the fact that physicians maintained care
was futile, and it cost well over one million dollars).
141. HALL, supra note 5, at 117.
142. Id.
143. Id.

at 131. Hall notes that philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued that moral values are
contingent upon the nature of the culture in which they operate, and are not universally true. [d. at 130.
MacIntyre thus warns against elevating individual beliefs to the scale of a universal moral principle. Id.
at 131.
144. [d. at 131.
145. Id. Troyen Brennan highlights this point in stating that "[tlhe ethical theory of medicine was
thus integral to, and sustained by, the economic and political structure of medical practice." BRENNAN,
supra note II, at 49.
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ignoring its cost, assumes that society has unlimited resources. 146 In
Hall's view, therefore, outside of the' fee-for-service system, no
ethical basis exists for requiring physicians to provide all potentially
beneficial health care regardless of cost. 147
Haavi Morreim supports this conception of the policy problem. 148
She notes that "the law, it appears, suffers from the same economic
naivete that infuses traditional moral notions of fidelity.,,149 With the
drive to control health care costs, it is necessary to take another look
at physicians' traditional ethic of uncompromised fidelity to their
patients. 150 It may no longer be realistic to expect that physicians will
pursue their patients' interests over those of society, third-party
payers, and even themselves. 151
It is no longer plausible to demand that physicians literally
always place patients' interests above their own, for in some
cases this will entail a self-sacrifice that is surely beyond the call
of duty. And we can no longer presume absolutely that the
physician will promote his patients' interests above the
competing claims of other patients, or of payers, institutional
providers, and society as a whole. We must therefore consider
more closely just what the physician owes his patient and,
equally important, what he does not owe. 152

Traditional notions of fidelity to patients, reflected in medical
ethics as well as the law, require physicians to promote their patients' .
interests above all others. Yet the economics of health care make this
requirement unrealistic. 153 This longstanding indifference to the cost
of health care is now untenable because it requires the physician to
deliver care with resources that he does not control. 154
146.

HALL, supra note 5, at 131.
147. ld.
148. See MORREIM, supra note IS, at 64.
149. See id. at 86.
150. ld. at 64.
151. ld.
152. ld.
153. ld. at 86.
154. MORREIM, supra note IS, at 86.
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[A] particular medical morality has developed. The physician is
duty bound to treat the patient with greatest respect. The
physician must maintain a loyalty to the patient and engender the
patient's trust. The patient must 'come first' even if this
requires some self-effacement and sacrifice on the part of the
physician . . . . Other concerns should not intrude on this
relationship. The moral code of beneficence works best if it is
isolated from the usual concerns of the liberal state, especially
the competitive market. 155

The law reinforces this isolation of the medical profession and its
ethics from the consequences of the costs of the care it delivers. 156
The result is that the law exposes the physician to potential liability
for "failing to do the impossible.,,157
In summary, the general policy problem stems from the fact that
the law with respect to physician liability does not fully account for
changes that have arisen as a result of the change from fee-for-service
medicine to managed health care. This conflict takes on greater
importance because the physician is not simply put in an ethical
dilemma by manage~ health care. She faces potential legal liability
and severe economic hann.
B. Potential Malpractice Liability

One of the specific manifestations of the general policy problem is
that physicians who are forced to ration at the bedside because of
participation in the managed care system face potential malpractice
liability.
[P]hysicians must choose between long-standing medico-legal
expectations and the reality of cost-containment measures. As a
result of the profound economic changes in the health care
delivery system, a practicing physician . . . has essentially

155.

BRENNAN.

supra note II, at 48.
15. at 86.

156. See MORREIM. supra note
157. See id.
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become the administrator of medical resource allocation. This
new role has impinged on the traditional standard of care
required of physicians .... The jurisprudential dilemma arises
when the medico-legal unitary standard of care is applied to the
physician's other role as a resource manager. 15S
One of the earliest cases to illustrate the issue is Wickline v. State
of Calijomia. 159 The central issue in that case was whether a plaintiff
could sue a third-party payer, Medi-Cal, for negligence where a costcontainment strategy allegedly affected the treating physician's
judgment and the patient subsequently suffered harm. 160 The patient,
Lois Wickline, received health care benefits under California's MediCal program. 161 Doctors diagnosed Wickline with arteriosclerosis,
which caused an obstruction of the terminal aorta. 162 Her physician
recommended surgery and obtained authorization from Medi-Cal for
the procedure and ten days of post-operative hospitalization. 163
Wickline had complications following the surgery and required two
subsequent surgeries to eliminate clotting and restore blood flow to
her leg. l64 Due to these and other potential complications, her
physician recommended that she remain in the hospital an additional
eight days. 165
The hospital completed the required forms and submitted them to
Medi-Cal requesting the additional eight-day stay.166 Medi-Cal's
first-line utilization review agent, a registered nurse, did not believe
the request warranted an additional eight days.167 She referred the
158. Hedgeman, supra note 4, at 306-08. Scholar Clark Havighurst states simply that "[alt this stage
in the managed care revolution ... cOIpOrate health plans have assumed extensive responsibility for the
cost of care without accepting more than nominal responsibility for its quality. Only a minute's
reflection should suggest that this situation is unlikely to be satisfactory as a matter of public policy."
Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability; Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care,
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 13 (2000).
159. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
16.Q. [d.at811.
161. [d. at 812.
162. [d.
163. [d.

164. Wickline,
165. [d. at 813.
166. [d.
167. [d. at 814.

239 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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case to a Medi-Cal physician "consultant," who instead authorized
four additional days.16S The physician consultant based his decision
on factors that Wickline and her physicians contended were irrelevant
to her circulatory condition. 169 Additionally, the physician consultant
did not discuss the case with a Medi-Cal consultant who specialized
in vascular surgery before making his decision. 17o Wickline's
physicians complied with Medi-Cal's decision and released her from
the hospital after four additional days.171 Nine days later, Wickline
returned to the hospital with a severe infection and clotting
problems. l72 Her physicians found it was necessary to amputate her
leg below the knee to save her life.173 Wickline's lawsuit alleged that
had she remained in the hospital the additional days; she would not
have lost her leg. 174 Yet in bringing suit, she did not allege that her
physicians committed malpractice or were in any way liable. 175 The
case attracted attention because the court held:
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from
.defects in the design or implementation of cost containment
mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's
behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or
unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 176

Yet the court went on to qualify its holding with respect to third-party
payers by stating that "the physician who complies without protest
with the limitations imposed by a third-party payor, when his medical
judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility
for his patient's care."I77 The court continued to say that "[h]e
16S. [d.
169. Wickline. 239 Cal. Rptr. at
170. /d.
171. [d.
172. [d. at S16.
173. [d.
174. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
175. [d.
176. [d. at S19.
177. [d.

SIS.

S17.
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cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when
the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go
sour.,,178
Significantly, the court stated that, although Medi-Cal intimidated
Wickline's physician, he should have made more of an effort to
challenge its determination that her coverage entitled her to only an
additional four days in the hospital. 179 The court noted that
Wickline's physicians authorized her discharge, and as such, "MediCal was not a party to that medical decision and therefore [could not]
be held to share in the harm resulting if such decision was negligently
made.,,180 The court concluded by stating:
This court appreciates that what is at issue here is the effect of
cost containment programs upon the professional judgment of
physicians . . . . While we recognize, realistically, that cost
consciousness has become a permanent feature of the health care
system, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be
permitted to corrupt medical judgment. lSI

Although the Wickline case was noteworthy because it allowed for
the fact that, in some cases, a third-party payer might be legally
responsible for poor medical outcomes that can be linked to costcontainment strategies,182 the case is also significant from a policy
perspective regarding the role of physicians in cost containment.
While recognizing that cost containment in health care was a new
policy that "ha[ d] become a permanent feature of the health care
system," the court's opinion perpetuated a long-held policy with
respect to physician liability.183 The court's narrow and unrealistic
interpretation of the facts of the case, that essentially Wickline's
treating physicians were divorced from the cost containment
178. /d.
179. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
180. [d.
181. [d. at 820 (emphasis added).
182. With respect to third-party liability, subsequent opinions limit the Wickline case, and it has not
provided the basis for any meaningful liability for MCOs enforcing cost-containment policies.
183. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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decisions made with respect to her health benefits, ensured that
physicians still retained full liability for treatment decisions, even
though they no longer solely make these decisions.
The policy revealed by the Wickline case is illustrated in more
recent cases as well. For instance, in Neade v. Portes,l84 the plaintiff
brought suit against her husband's physician and his practice for
medical malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.18S The central
issue in the case was whether, in the context of a medical malpractice
action, a patient has a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
against the physician for failing to disclose that the physician had
fInancial incentives to limit care pursuant to an arrangement with an
MCO. 186
In Neade, the plaintiff's husband consulted his primary care
physician for chest pain and shortness of breath. 187 Neade had a
family history of heart disease, suffered from hypertension, was
overweight, smoked heavily, and had high cholesterol. 188 The
primary care physician briefly hospitalized him and conducted certain
tests, including a thallium stress test and an electrocardiogram
(EKG).189 Doctors concluded that the results of these tests were
normal, and the hospital discharged him with a diagnosis of a hiatal
hernia and/or esophagitis. 190
Several days later, Neade returned to his primary care physician
still complaining of chest pain. 191 The physician, relying on the
results of the thallium stress test and EKG, determined that the chest
pain was not cardiac related. 192 Neade returned the following month,
complaining of severe chest pain. 193 Neade's primary care physician
requested that his associate examine him. 194 Based on this exam, the
184. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Dl. 2(00).
[d. at 499.
[d. at 498.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

[d.
[d.

Neade.

739 N.E.2d at 498.

[d.

[d.
[d.
[d.

Neade.

739 N.E.2d at 498.
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primary care physician's associate recommended an angiogram, a test
that is better at diagnosing coronary artery disease than a thallium
stress test. 195 The primary care physician refused to order the
angiogram. 196 Several months later, Neade returned to his primary
care physician again complaining of chest pain. 197 Once again, an
associate of the primary care physician recommended an angiogram,
but his primary care physician refused, citing the normal thallium
stress test. 198 A few months later Neade suffered a massive heart
attack and died. 199
The plaintiff alleged that her husband's primary care physician had
negotiated a contract with an HMO pursuant to which the physician's
group would receive from the HMO $75,000 per year, called the
"Medical Incentive Fund," to be used by the group to cover costs for
patient referrals and outside tests?oo Under the contract with the
HMO, whatever portion of the Medical Incentive Fund that the
practice group did not use for referrals or outside tests was divided up
at the end of the year; the primary care physician's group received
60% of the remaining funds and the HMO received 40%.201 If the
fund was depleted, the HMO required the primary care physician and
his group to make up the difference. 202 The plaintiff was not aware
of this arrangement at the time her husband sought care. 203 The court
held that the plaintiff could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty separate from a medical malpractice claim; the breach of
fiduciary duty claim was unnecessary because the "traditional
medical negligence claim sufficiently addresses the same alleged
misconduct.,,204 The court did hold, however, that to the extent the
primary care physician testified in his defense at trial, the plaintiff
could use evidence of the Medical Incentive Fund and the physician's
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

[d.

200.
201.
202.
203.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 499.

[d.
Neade.

204. Neade.

739 N.E.2d at 499.

739 N.E.2d at 503.
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potential gain from it to impeach his credibility.205
Like Wickline, Neade is significant in that it illustrates the potential
for liability where a physician acts to control costs. Unlike Wickline,
the decisions in Neade were solely in the hands of the treating
physician. However, the policy issue is the same. The court held that
considerations of cost in treating a patient and any resulting harm
were squarely within the realm of a malpractice suit. 206 The court
even went so far as to say that financial incentives that aim to control
costs by placing the physician's interests directly at odds with those
of the patient could be used at trial as evidence against the physician
to impeach his credibility.207 Clearly, the prevailing public policy is
that limiting care with cost in mind should not be part of the
physician-patient relationship.
Though Wickline and Neade directly address the physician's role in
cost containment activities by MCOs, other cases in which the
physician receives little attention from the court illustrate the policy
problem. In both Pegram v. Herdrich,208 and Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Insurance,209 the courts noted that, although the plaintiffs
had brought suit against the managed care organization, separate suits
were pending against the providers.
In addition, traditional malpractice liability may, at least in some
states, expand to include liability for failing to advocate on behalf of
the patient for the approval of health benefits. In those situations,
plaintiffs would premise negligence on a duty that requires more than
care and skill in directly treating the patient. In Nealy v. U.S.
Healthcare HMO,210 the plaintiff alleged that a physician delayed in
submitting the appropriate form to the HMO requesting authorization
for a visit with an out-of-network cardiologist. 211 The HMO
ultimately denied authorization, and the patient died. 212 The .court
205.
206.
207.

[d. at 506.
[d. at 504.
[d. at 506.

208. 530 U.s. 211 (2000).
209. 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
210. 711 N.E.2d621 (N.Y. 1999).
211. Nealy, 711 N.E.2d at 622-23.
212. [d. at 623.
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held that ERISA did not preempt the claim against the physician and
that it could proceed in state court under a malpractice theory because
the complaint alleged the physician failed to take timely action to
treat the patient. 213 As the court stated in Pryzbowski v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc.,214 "Nealy stands for the proposition that under New
York law the physician's duties in providing care to hislher patients
may be broader than the mere medical treatment decision.,,215 In
Pryzbowski, the plaintiff brought a claim against her treating
physicians claiming they had a duty to advocate on her behalf for the
timely approval of benefits. 216 The court rejected the claim, but left
open the possibility for such a claim in the future. 217
In summary, the law clearly does not fully embrace the notion of
physicians' cutting costs in health care when such decisions result in
limiting services to individual patients. This policy choice raises
important issues of fundamental fairness. In addition, and more
importantly, the policy of viewing physicians and health-care payers
as being on different teams with respect to cost containment has
significant utilitarian effects.
C. The Threat of Deselection/Terminationfrom an Mea

A second manifestation of the policy problem is that physicians
who participate with managed care plans often face termination or
"deselection" from the plan at any time, without a showing of
cause. 218 Physicians who do not ration care or control costs in line
with MCOs' policies, or who advocate too strongly for patient care,
fear and often face termination from the plan?19 However, as
discussed above, rationing care to comply with an MCO's costcontainment strategy often carries the threat of malpractice liability.
In an effort to contain health-care costs, MCOs select physicians
213. [d. at 625.

214. 245 F.3d 266. 280 (3rd Cir. 2001).
215. [d. at 280.
216. [d. at 270.
217. [d. at 281-82.
218. See Richard S. Liner. Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the PhysicianPatient Relationship. 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 511. 516 (1997).
219. See generally Liner. supra note 218. at 516-18.
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who will provide quality health care at the lowest cost to be part of
their plans. 22o Once physicians are on the plan, MeOs use several
strategies to ensure their health-care costs remain controlled. These
strategies include capitation arrangements, financial incentives,
utilization review, and other methods. An important part of the cost
containment strategy, however, is tracking the economic performance
of individual physicians. 221 Physicians who do not meet MeO's
economic performance criteria and, less often, quality criteria, are
terminated or "deselected" from the plan. 222 MeOs reserve the right
to terminate without cause through a typical provision contained in
MeO-physician contracts. 223 Such provisions often permit the plan
to deselect the physician with little or no notice at any time during the
contract period?24 Similarly, these provisions typically give the
MeO the power simply not to renew the agreement at the end of the
contract term?25 "Deselection acts as a check on physicians by
allowing MeOs to eliminate those physicians providing unnecessary
or excessive care, or exceeding the MeO's expected costs for patient
care .... Terminations without cause, however, often have more to do
with economic factors than competence or quality.,,226
The economic factors that weigh into the deselection decision are
often not apparent to the physician.227 "Physicians. . . often have no
knowledge of their MeO's economic expectations in the
credentialing process.,,228 Indeed, physicians' treatment decisions,
scrutinized by Meos for economic efficiency, are usually within the
accepted standard of care. The standard of care does not generally
incorporate cost considerations in the treatment equation.
On the one hand, the power to deselect physicians who are not
facilitating an Meo's cost-containment strategy is an important
at 513.
at 516-17.
at 516-17.
at 516.
224. Uner, supra note 218, at 516.
225. [d. at 516.
226. [d. at 516-17.
227. [d. at 517.

220. [d.
[d.
222. [d.
223. [d.

221.

228. [d.
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one. 229 In striving to keep costs down,MCOs must have the ability
to remove physicians from their respective plans, or controlling
health care costs might be doomed to fail. However, deselection is
problematic when viewed in light of the circumstances in which this
power is deployed. Physicians are now economically dependent upon
MCOS. 230 Participation with an MCO, especially in some practice
areas, is necessary for physicians to have a sufficient patient pool to
sustain their practices.23J Due to MCOs' market power, physicians
not only must participate in the plan, but they also have little ability
to negotiate the terms under which they deal with the plan. 232
Physicians report that MCOs have threatened deselection or even
terminated physicians for appealing an adverse coverage decision on
behalf of a patient. 233 This report is particularly troublesome given
that, in some jurisdictions, a physician may be liable for not working
hard enough through appeals or otherwise to secure treatment for the
patient. 234 Moreover, some physicians privately confess that they are
reluctant to take on new patients who may be severely or chronically
ill, because of the high costs involved in treating such patients. 235
The consequences of deselection for the physician are greater than
simply losing patients and income. 236 Other MCOs are less likely to
accept a previously deselected physician. 237 Additionally, deselection
may damage physicians' reputations. 238 Even when a physician has
not faced deselection, the threat of termination without cause, at any
time, causes great anxiety, often motivating physicians to consider
their livelihood and the MCO's interest ahead of, or at least
However, these
concurrently with, the patient's needs. 239
229. Liner. supra note 218. at 516.
230. See id. at 517; Little. supra note 20. at 1402.
231. See Little. supra note 20. at 1427-28.
232. See id. at 1402.
233. See id. at 1446; Ken Terry. No Cause Terminations: Will They Go Up in Flames? MED.
Jan. 12. 1998. at 130.
234. See supra Part ill.B.
235. See Terry, supra note 233. at 130.
236. Liner. supra note 218, at 517.
237. [d.
238. [d.
239. [d. at 517-18.
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considerations can lead to potential malpractice liability?40
Some states have recognized that terminating or deselecting a
physician from a plan has important public policy effects. 241 In the
last several years, at least twelve states have enacted legislation to
deal with the issue. 242 These laws generally require that the MeO
inform the physician of the reason for termination in writing, provide
some type of appeals process, or provide physicians with the criteria
for the "economic credentialing" that is often the reason for
deselection. 243 MeOs point out that the more protections physicians
receive, the greater the chance of passing the costs on to the
consumer. Physicians assert that most state statutes are ineffective
because they provide MeOs with too many 100pholes. 244 For
instance, some states that require an appeals process permit the Meo
to appoint the review panel, effectively making it an in-house
appeal. 245 Additionally, state laws generally do not cover contract
renewals. MeOs are able to wait until the end of the contract term
(typically the end of the year) and simply refuse to renew a
physician's contract instead of deselecting him or her mid_year. 246
Therefore, these initiatives do not provide complete protection for
physicians. Indeed, despite these efforts to alleviate some of the
concern over deselection, physicians still fear that MeOs could
terminate them. Both the actual termination from an MeO and the
fear of termination have important policy effects.

D. Ethical Issues Raised by the Policy Problem
Some commentators argue that, with relatively few published
decisions evidencing any actual physician liability for rationing
decisions made within the context of managed care, the problem is
not as significant as has been asserted. Similarly, it may be argued
240. See supra Part m.B .
See generally Terry. supra note 233.
242. See id. at 130.
243. [d.
244. See id. at 134.
245. See id. at 140.
246. Terry. supra note 233. at 134.
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that MCOs actually terminate few physicians from plans, and·
therefore the threat of termination is not enough to raise an ethical
concern. This is simply not the case. Although holding physicians
liable for rationing decisions made under pressure from MCOs raises
significant ethical issues, the threat or fear of liability or termination
felt by physicians has perhaps even more important policy effects.
1. Fundamental Fairness
The first area in which the policy problem presents troubling
ethical issues is with respect to notions of fundamental· fairness.
Society faces a pressing need to control health care costs. Controlling
costs necessarily involves physicians, who are the agents responsible
for actually delivering care. Yet our current legal framework, while
sanctioning cost-cutting programs by MCOs, does not also sanction
cost cutting through bedside rationing by physicians. 247 Therefore,
MCOs that encourage and indeed require physicians to control costs
routinely escape liability for poor patient outcomes, while physicians
do not. This problem forms the basis for an ethical claim that the
current legal structure is fundamentally unfair.
Craig Carr explains the moral value of a fairness claim in his work
On Fairness. 248 He notes that fairness "raises significant moral
concerns, and claims about being treated unfairly carry considerable
moral weight-at least as much, if not more, than claims about being
treated unjustly or unequally.,,249 Carr states that there are several
features of fairness derived from the "meager literature" on the
subject:
1. Fairness involves not disadvantaging others.
2. Fairness involves being unbiased, impartial, or neutral in our

treatment of others.
3. Fairness involves sharing burdens or benefits equally, or
maintaining a proper proportion between benefit and
247. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.

248.

CRAIG L. CARR, ON FAIRNESS (Ashgate

249. [d. at 1.

211, 221-22 (2000).
2000).
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contribution.
4. Fairness involves treating equal or similar cases equally or
similarly.
5. Fairness involves adhering to the rules.
6. Fairness involves treating others with the concern and respect
they deserve. 25o
In addition to this list, Carr suggests that fairness involves another
dimension. He
locate[s] fairness within the context of moral concerns that
govern the activity of joining with others and pursuing some
type of cooperative venture. Fairness ... matters from a moral
point of view because it is a central virtue of cooperation, and
we are, of course, social beings who both want and need to
cooperate with one another. 25J
Carr finds that fairness requires that people perform their share of
252
the work and that they get their share of what they helped produce.
Fairness "precludes a particular type of free-riding; people who
benefit from the fact that others submit to certain rules are presumed
to stand under an obligation to submit to these rules themselves.,,253
The situations in which the principles of fairness have particular
moral force are those where the individuals involved are linked in
some way as fellow participants in a social practice or activity.254
Therefore, according to Carr, the moral heart of fairness is that parties
who are linked in some type of cooperative venture must share the
burdens as well as the benefits. 255 In the case of physicians and
MCOs, it can be argued that the parties are linked in a cooperative
venture-providing health care while controlling costs. Though
many physicians might assert that they are in no way working
250. [d. at 2.
251. [d. at 2-3.
252. [d. at 26.
253. CARR. supra note
254. [d.
255. [d.

248. at 26.

2003]

PHYSICIAN LIABILITY AND MANAGED CARE

679

together with MCOs, and in fact perceive themselves to be in an
adversarial relationship with them, the fact remains that each is an
indispensable party to the goal of providing health care while
controlling costs. Today, nearly all physicians are dependent upon
MCOs for patients and reimbursements, and MCOs cannot control
costs without relying upon physicians to make judgments that ration
care at the bedside. 256
There is an obvious organizational link between physicians and
MCOs: "While the values of individual physicians undoubtedly play
a critical role in clinical decision making, the organizations involved
also wield tremendous amounts of power to shape the context in
which ethical challenges arise. They play an important part in
creating cultures that influence physician practices. ,,257 Physicians
and MCOs are also linked by public policy. The framework of our
current health care system, which supports employer-provided health
insurance and encourages cost-containment through managed care,
envisions and indeed forces physicians and MCOs to work together
on some level.
Given that physicians and MCOs are "in it together," so to speak,
principles of fairness require a just distribution of the burdens of
providing health care while containing its cost. As a result of the
policy problem, however, the burdens are not fairly distributed. The
current policy of encouraging control of health care costs through the
use of MCOs, which achieves (or attempts to achieve) health care
cost reductions through the use of bedside rationing, is unfair because
physicians and MCOs do not share the liability burdens for such
rationing. While MCOs reap significant benefits through the use of
cost-containment strategies, the liability burden falls squarely on the
shoulders of physicians because the law provides MCOs with
powerful immunity through ERISA. Moreover, the law has not
accounted for changes in the delivery of health care by modifying
physician liability.

256. See Liner. supra note 218. at 516.
257. See WONG. supra note 14. at 4.
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The Andrews-Clarke258 case illustrates this unfairness. The
plaintiff brought suit against the MCa that administered the health
benefit plan she carried through her employer. 259 The plaintiffs
husband had a severe drinking problem and was hospitalized
repeatedly for treatment. 260 The hospitalizations were only long
enough to treat whatever acute problem was caused by the husband's
Despite physicians' recommendations for an
alcoholism. 261
extended, in-patient treatment program, the plaintiff s health insurer
did not authorize such treatment. 262 The plaintiff s health benefit
plan, however, explicitly provided for at least one thirty-day inpatient rehabilitation program per year. 263 After the hospital released
him from a final, alcohol-related overnight stay, the plaintiff s
husband consumed more alcohol and was subsequently found dead in
a parked car. 264 The plaintiff sued the MCO, claiming that its refusal
to grant the extended in-patient alcohol treatment that was
recommended by her husband's physicians, and part of her benefit
package, caused her husband's death.265 The plaintiff also brought
state law malpractice claims against the hospitals that treated her
husband. 266 The court noted that "[u]nder traditional notions of
justice, the harms alleged-if true-should entitle [the plaintiff] to
some legal remedy on behalf of herself and her children against [the
MCO].,,267 However, the court noted that ERISA preempted all of
her claims. 268 The court explained that "the practical impact of
ERISA in this case is to immunize Travelers and Greenspring- from
any potential liability for the consequences of their denial of
benefits.,,269
258. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
at 50.
260. [d. at 50-51.
261. [d.at51.
259. [d.

262. [d.
263. Andrews-Clarke. 984 F.

Supp. at 51.

264. [d. at 51-52.
265. [d. at 52.
266. [d.
267. [d.
268. Andrews-Clarke. 984 F. Supp. at 53-55.
269. [d. at 55-56 (emphasis in original).
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The Andrews-Clarke case is typical and clearly illustrates the effect
of ERISA preemption. As the court stated, "the shield of near
absolute immunity now provided by ERISA cannot be justified.'.270
Yet it is not just the unfairness to plaintiffs left without a meaningful
remedy that is troubling about this policy. There is also a less
apparent effect on physicians. The court in Andrews-Clarke noted
this by stating:
[T]his Court notes that the immunity currently afforded to
insurers and utilization review providers unfairly leaves doctors,
"quite literally, caught in the middle in the battle over treatment
between patients and the HMOs" (citation omitted). Doctors
who complain too vigorously about denials of care by the
managed care plan face the risk of being kicked out of the plan's
network of approved providers (citation omitted). Yet, thanks to
ERISA, when a treating physician makes a decision to discharge
a patient because an insurance company refuses to pay benefits,
the patient's sole recourse is against the physician, and insurers
are quick to abandon him to litigation (citation omitted). Indeed,
when asked what remedy was left to [the plaintiff], the insurer's
lawyer said, "Sue the providers," (i.e., sue the doctors and
hospitals-but not us) (citation omitted).
This result
contravenes fundamental principles of joint tort liability.271

As the Andrews-Clarke case illustrates, MCOs receive a
significant benefit from the current policy that holds physicians fully
responsible for negative patient outcomes that result from costcontainment strategies, but very often immunizes the health plans,
who actually drive such decisions .. Although some recent cases have
indicated that in limited circumstances MCOs might be liable for
actions that negatively affect patient outcomes, such exceptions are
not sweeping or certain enough to mitigate the unfairness of the
current liability scheme. Moreover, the costs to litigate such issues
270. [d. at 63.
271. [d. at 63-64, n.74.
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raise significant utilitarian concerns.
Accordingly, although under the former, retrospective fee-forservice system, where passive third-party payers simply reimbursed a
physician for whatever care deemed "necessary," the tort liability
scheme was fair, the same is not true today. Under the former
system, physicians enjoyed autonomy over their medical decisions.
They controlled the care the patient received, and by and large, they
could marshal the resources as part of the care. There was little issue
of shared responsibility for negative patient outcomes; the physician
stood alone as the captain of the ship. Thus, the tort liability faced
solely by physicians might be fair, as a policy matter, if the decision
of whether to ration care remained solely in the control of physicians.
2. Utilitarianism

Though the policy problem outlined above raises significant issues
of fundamental fairness, this problem alone might not be enough to
justify a policy change or policy solution. Indeed, if a weightier
~thical consideration, such as controlling health care costs to keep our
health care system sustainable and accessible to as many people as
possible justified the unfairness to physicians, the matter might end
there. The physician's right to fair treatment with respect to legal
liability might have to yield in the face of a strong utilitarian
justification for keeping such a policy in place. However, this is not
the case. In addition to significant issues of fundamental fairness, the
policy problem presents a much larger ethical issue, implicating
significant utilitarian concerns. Specifically, our current policy
serves ultimately to undermine society's goals of controlling health
care costs. The costs of the policy problem far outweigh the benefits,
and as such we are not maximizing health care resources or positive
health care outcomes.
An examination of the differences between act utilitarianism and
rule utilitarianism best explains the effects of the policy problem. An
agent satisfies act utilitarianism "if and only if he does an act which
has at least as good consequences as any other available under the
circumstances. Thus, an agent who satisfies [act utilitarianism] in
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any situation produces the best consequences he can possibly produce
in that situation.,,272 In contrast, rule utilitarianism directs "each
agent to satisfy the set of rules it would be best for everyone to satisfy
.... ,,273 As will be discussed below, the current liability framework
applied to physicians is flawed from a rule utilitarian perspective.
While the prior fee-for-service system and the legal rules that were
shaped by it might have some "'ethical justification, this system
ultimately does not encourage conduct that is best for everyone to
satisfy. Physicians' attempts to satisfy the current liability rules do
not achieve the best overall health care outcome.
The policy problem is a complex one, in that the current legal
framework is not without benefits. First, providing a virtual liability
shield to MCOs allows them to employ important cost-cutting
strategies that lead to reduced overall health care spending. As the
court explained in Pryzbowski v. u.s. Healthcare, Inc.,274 "a holding
that Pryzbowski's claims against u.s. Healthcare are not completely
preempted would open the door for legal challenges to core managed
care practices (e.g., the policy of favoring in-network specialists over
out-of-network specialists), which the Supreme Court eschewed in
Pegram.'.275
Moreover, keeping liability to a minimum for
employing cost-containment strategies ultimately keeps the costs of
health insurance down, so that presumably, more individuals can
have access to health care.
Another benefit to the current policy is that traditional liability
rules carry the weight of consistency. They are premised on many
fundamental principles of medical ethics, which we believe to be
important, such as physician loyalty to the patient. The public, by
and large, is comfortable with these rules. Moreover, current liability
rules play an important role in encouraging physicians to deliver
quality care and providing a remedy to patients when physicians do
not deliver such care .. Therefore, it is important to stress that it is not
the system of rules providing for physician liability that is flawed, but
272. DONALD H. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 18 (Clarendon Press 1980).
273. Id. at 83.
274. 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001).
275. Id. at 274-75.
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rather, the rules' specific fonnulation and implementation through the
standard of care. Therefore, the current standard of care, defined by
the medical profession and imposed by the law, is ethically troubling
from a rule utilitarian perspective.
Despite the benefits described above, the costs of the policy on
physician liability have become too great. Commentators may argue
that principles of act utilitarianism,. among other things, justify
physicians' actions with respect to health care delivery. That is, by
committing themselves to maximizing health care outcomes for each
individual patient, physicians might assert that the delivery of health
care with little regard to overall cost nevertheless maximizes utility.
Physicians' fiduciary and ethical duties, which require the patients'
needs to be put first, .buttresses this moral justification. Also, the fact
that it is difficult to assess the impact on others of this "patient first"
practice strengthens the argument. Therefore, one might assert that
the negative utility of such a system is too speculative compared to
the benefits of the prevailing health care delivery system. Yet, while.
we cannot specifically state that ignoring costs for one patient leads
to less treatment for another, the overall impact of such actions is
clear--escalating health care costs, which generally threatens the
health care system. An act utilitarian justification is really illusory,
and the costs of the policy far outweigh the benefits.
At first glance, this conclusion might seem intuitively incorrect. It
may appear that summing up positive health care outcomes produces
the greatest overall health care consequences. However, if physicians
work to maximize individual health. care outcomes in any given
medical situation, regardless of societal costs, we do not achieve the
best possible overall health care results. Such a system ultimately
Requiring physicians to provide all
cannot be sustained. 276
potentially beneficial care to individuals without considering overall
societal costs is problematic because such a system does not
necessarily produce a better individual health care outcome. 277 The
marginal utility of additional costly treatments, tests, procedures, and
276. See HALL, supra note 5, at 117.
277. See id. at 131.
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office VISItS for a given patient is often very low. Incorporating
sensible cost considerations into the treatment decision often does not
in any way diminish individual health care outcomes.
"Because physicians play such an integral role in health care
delivery, cost containment is impossible unless they make it an
.essential factor in their decision making.'.278 The current policy
undermines this effort by subjecting physicians to liability for
rationing care as a way to control costS?79 Because physicians face
such liability, they will not and do not fully embrace cost containment
efforts.
For. instance, recent studies have documented that physicians will,
and often do, lie for their patients to obtain what physicians believe to
be necessary care. 280 Indeed, studies have documented that this
"gaming the system," as physicians often call it, is more prevalent
under managed health care. 281 Because physicians do not see
themselves as on the same team with MeOs in cutting health care
costs, and because physicians feel an ethical and legal obligation to
provide care, they will often engage in deception, for example, by
exaggerating a diagnosis to obtain authorization and coverage for a
recommended treatment. 282 A recent study found sanctioning of
deception occurred more frequently in markets with higher managed
care penetration?83 An overwhelming majority of physicians studied
indicated that they believed that, in many cases, deception was .
consistent with their professional obligations, and that they in fact
had to resort to deception to advance their patients' interests. 284 In
addition, it has long been documented that so-called "defensive
medicine" is responsible for a significant amount of· health care
costS. 285 Although commentators dispute whether the figure is as
278. Robert I. Herrington, Herdrich v. Pegram: ERISA Fiduciary Liability and Physician Incentives
to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 716 (2000).
279. Id. at 719-20.
280. See Victor G. Freeman, et al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers,
159 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2263 (1999).
281. Id. at 2263.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2267.
See MENZEL, supra note 49, at

152.
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high as the fifty-two billion dollars estimated by the American
Medical Association, "[l]iability suits have undoubtedly constituted a
cost-escalating pressure in medicine.,,286
Additionally, the current policy has significant costs because it
creates an adversarial relationship between MCOs and physicians,
and to some extent physicians and their patients. Therefore, not only
is current liability policy failing to produce and maximize overall
positive health care outcomes, it is also in many cases failing to
produce even positive individual health-care outcomes. For example,
the problem of tenninating physicians from plans because of overutilization or advocating for patients breaks up the continuity of
physician-patient relationships?87
These points have been
highlighted in the literature discussing the effects of managed care,
and therefore will not be discussed here. However, it is important to
note that the policy problem has had negative effects not just on
physicians, but on patients as well.
Physician liability rules, instead of maximizing utility, in fact
undennine society's overall goal of lowering health-care costs, and
therefore the rules fail to produce the greatest overall health care
"good.,,288 Therefore, changing these rules is necessary and ethically
justified, and must be done in such a way that guides physicians
toward reaching the best overall result, even if it sometimes produces
a less than optimal outcome in individual cases. The rules must be
structured so that physicians no longer feel compelled by law and
their "patient first" ethics to maximize their individual patients'
health outcomes at the expense of society's goal of controlling health
care costS. 289
N. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

There are several potential solutions to the policy problem. First,
proponents of the status quo believe that physicians must operate
286.
287.
288.
289.

See id. at 151.
See Liner. supra note 218. at 518; Little. supra note 20. at
See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1842.
See id. at 1842.

1402.
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under the same standards and requirements as they always have
because any changes to account for the effects of managed care
would be detrimental to patients. Second, there are proposals for
greater MCO liability by removing ERISA immunity. A third
solution envisions targeted legislation to control the negative effects
of managed care. Finally, a fourth potential solution proposes
changing the malpractice standard to allow for considerations of cost.
A. Maintain the Current Standard of Care

One approach to the policy problem is to leave in place the
"patient-interest oriented" standard of care, and instead find ways to
consider costs outside the physician-patient relationship.290
Commentators argue that cost considerations should be brought into
health care through explicit rationing mechanisms that work outside
The foundation of this
the physician-patient relationship.291
argument is that changing the standard of care to incorporate cost
considerations would' "dramatically alter the fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship," and such an alteration should be
avoided at all costS. 292
Maintaining the current standard of care is an attractive solution
because it appeals to notions of absolute physician fidelity. 293 This
approach has long been the driving ethical justification of the model
physician-patient relationship and, therefore, as a policy solution it
has the appeal of continuity and the support of intuition. Yet this
approach is problematic for several reasons. First, it centers on
preserving the so-called sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.
Though the fiduciary nature of the relationship is important, it is
equally important to keep in mind the extent of the fiduciary duty.
Proponents of the current standard of care argue that changing the
. standard would essentially give the physician "permission to consider
matters that [are] not necessarily in the patient's interest when
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 1845-46.
See id. at 1846.
[d. at 1844.
See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1844.
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evaluating a course of treatment.,,294 They assert that, by considering
cost, the physician "might even be required or allowed to recommend
a course of care that [is] not optimal.,,295 Yet this argument for
avoiding any consideration of cost takes an unrealistic view of the
physician-patient relationship. The ideal of the physician-patient
relationship has been exaggerated; the potential has long been present
for the phySician to take action that might not be in the best interests
of the patient, for example, by recommending too much care because
it was in the physicians' economic interest to do SO.296
Second, proponents of maintaining the standard of care argue that
changing the standard to accommodate society's interest in
controlling costs would be difficult and problematic because it is not
clear how to take such considerations into account in a "consistent
and equitable manner.,,297 Though bringing cost into the treatment
relationship would not be· easy, this objection is not a reason to
maintain the status quo. Applying the current standard of care in a
"consistent and equitable manner" has proven problematic as
physicians take many different approaches to treating similar
illnesses, with variances based on little more than the geographic
location of the physician and patient. There is no reason to think that
clinical-practice guidelines, supported by the government, and
modifications to medical education could not do as good a job, if not
better, at maintaining consistency in approaches to treating illness.
Also problematic is the assumption that explicit rationing
mechanisms can accomplish cost-containment with the current
standard of care. First, such an approach likely would not work
because it would encourage physicians to manipulate the system to
secure resources for patients. By leaving physicians off of the costcontainment team, explicit rationing would therefore have little
legitimacy and staying power. Indeed, such an approach would likely
breed the same hostility among physicians that managed care has,
with physicians seeing themselves as warriors for patients in the fight
294. [d.
295. [d.

296.

WONG, supra note

14, at 65.

297. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1844.
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against the forces that seek to control costS. 298 Moreover, explicit
rationing based on government or third-party guidelines would leave
little room for the uniqueness of individual cases. 299
In summary, the status quo approach is problematic because it
perpetuates both unfairness to physicians and the old thinking shared
by patients and the medical community that physicians should not
consider costs in the treatment decision. This approach raises
significant utilitarian concerns.
B. Targeted Legislation

Another possible solution to the policy problem is for the federal
government or states to p~ss targeted legislation. Indeed, many states
have attempted initiatives aimed at minimizing unfairness to
physicians and protecting the physician-patient relationship. While
these reforms can, in some instances, be helpful, they are not the best
solution to the policy problem.
Numerous pieces of targeted legislation focus on aspects of the
policy problem. For instance, California has a statute, similar to
those in other states,300 that aims to "provide protection against
retaliation for physicians who advocate for medically appropriate
health care for their patients.,,301 The statute provides:
The application and rendering by any person of a decision to
terminate an employment or other contractual relationship with,
or otherwise penalize, a physician and surgeon principally for
advocating for medically appropriate health care consistent with
that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by
reputable legal physicians practicing according to the applicable
standard of care violates the public policy of this state. No
person shall terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penalize a
physician and surgeon for that advocacy, nor shall any person
298. See Field. supra note 1. at 481-82.
299. See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1845.
300. See. e.g., 215 Iu... CaMP. STAT. ANN.

301.

134-35 (West
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West 2(01).

2(01); PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2113 (2000).
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prohibit, restrict, or in any way discourage a physician and
surgeon from communicating to a patient information in
furtherance of medically appropriate health care. 302
Other examples of targeted managed care legislation exist on the
federal level. For example, in 1996, Congress passed the Newborns'
and Mothers' Health Care Protection Act303 in response to public
concern over so-called "drive-through deliveries" whereby health
plans required hospitals to discharge mothers and newborns from the
hospital, assuming no major health complications existed, within
twenty-four hours after delivery. The legislation required all health
plans to provide coverage for a minimum forty-eight hour hospital
stay. Other bills have required health plans to cover specialized
women's health services such as minimum hospital stays for
mastectomies and lumpectomies,304 annual mammograms for women
over forty, and certain gynecological services. 305
Targeted federal and state initiatives, while in some cases helpful,
do not address the full policy problem. Indeed, such initiatives,
assuming they are not preempted by ERISA, can create additional
problems that ultimately undermine the central goal of the drive to
reform health care-lowering costs. "Consumer protection against
managed care is particularly subject to 'mom-and-apple-pie' rhetoric
and legislative posturing.,,306
This posturing can lead to
"misdirected" legislative initiatives in that, "[e]ven when the
legislature successfully identifies a real problem, the issue is
invariably more complex than it first appears, and the proposed
reforms suffer from their own shortcomings, even without factoring
in the (usually carefully ignored) economic implications.,,307
There are many examples of this problem. First, statutes like the
one In California, while providing some protection for physicians
302. [d.

303. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185).
304. Breast Cancer Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 536, 107th Congo (2001); Women's Cancer
Recovery Act of 2001, H.R. 1485, 107th Congo (2001).
305. Mammogram Availability Act of 1997, H.R. 617, S. 727, 105th Congo (1997).
306. Hyman, supra note 122, at 303.
307. [d. at 303-04.
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against retaliation, do so imperfectly. It is often difficult to show the
real reason why a physician was terminated from a plan. 308 In
addition, such statutes would ultimately increase litigation by
physicians against health plans. Although the litigation may be wellfounded, it would almost certainly drive up the cost of health care by
creating additional costs for health plans.
In addition, piecemeal legislation does nothing to get the physician
involved in cutting the costs of health care. The assumption
underlying many such legislative initiatives is that physicians should
practice medicine like they did in the fee-for-service days, putting
individual patients first and advocating for all treatment that is within
the current standard of care. The standard of care does not include
considerations of cost. Therefore, while providing some measure of
relief for physicians, on its own, targeted legislation likely would do
little to encourage a reduction in health care costs. This problem
makes such legislation weak from a utilitarian perspective because it
could do more overall harm than good.
C. Provide for Direct MeO Liability

A third possible solution to the policy problem is federal
legislation either to amend ERISA or, standing on its own, to give
patients a direct right to sue their MCOs for injury caused when costcontainment decisions may have contributed to a poor patient
outcome. Numerous lawmakers and commentators advocate this
approach. Recently there have been several "Patients Bill of Rights"
proposals in Congress. 309 Such proposals would not only give
patients a right to sue their MCOs, but would also guarantee a right to
direct access to certain specialists such as obstetricians, gynecologists
and pediatricians. They would also require MCOs to have an
external appeals process in place if a patient wanted to challenge a
coverage decision. 310 In addition to legislative initiatives to give
patients a direct right to sue MCOs, some courts recently have shown
308. Liner. supra note 218. at 517.
309. See Hyman, supra note 122. at 289.
310. See id. at 291-92.
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a willingness to limit the ERISA preemption shield that MeOs have
enjoyed. 311
The court in Andrews-Clarke summarized the benefits of imposing
direct liability on MeOs. The court criticized piecemeal approaches
to managed care regulation and stated that instead of attempting to
regulate managed health care procedure-by-procedure, "the more
efficient approach is to allow insurers and utilization review
providers to make benefit determinations on a case-by-case basis, but
hold them legally accountable for the consequences of their
decisions.,,312 The court in that case and others have noted that, by
holding MeOs directly accountable, unwarranted cost-cutting in the
utilization review process will not be cost-free to the MeO, and
therefore MeOs will have greater incentives to ensure high-quality
services as well as lower costS. 313
This solution to the policy problem is attractive in that it would
mitigate at least some of the unfairness that currently results from
making physicians primarily liable for cost-cutting treatment
decisions. Such an approach is intuitively and legally appealing
because MeOs would be subject to liability and therefore
accountable for their actions. Enacted on the federal level, such a
right would apply to all MeO subscribers and would therefore have
the appeal of uniformity of a remedy for those who allege injury, as
well as uniformity of requirements and legal precedent for the MeOs
who would be subject to liability. Despite the apparent benefits of
this proposal, however, it is not the solution that would produce the
overall best outcome for health care.
Although guaranteeing patients a right to sue their health plans is
politically popular, it is clear even to proponents of the legislation
that such a right will increase the costs of health insurance.
Similarly, recent cases denying ERISA preemption and allowing
claims to go forward against MeOs involve significant costs. The
cost to litigate such complex lawsuits will ultimately get passed on to
311.

See. e.g.•

Cristantielli v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1063 (N.D. Tex.

2(00).

312. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (emphasis in original).
at 63.

313. [d.
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health insurance subscribers. 314 These cost increases likely will lead
to a growing number of uninsured individuals. 315 Furthermore, such
initiatives, standing alone, do little to change the perception that
rationing care is wrong and that cost should not be a component of
the treatment decision. While it helps physicians and MCOs to share
more fully the liability burdens of cost containment, it does little to
encourage individual physicians and the medical profession to do
more to contain health care costs. To some extent, such a proposal is
ultimately premised on the theory that physicians should practice
medicine the way they did in the fee-for-service days. The direct
liability proposal, therefore, suffers from important utilitarian flaws.
Accordingly, though such a proposal is not inconsistent with an ideal
policy response, standing alone it does not do enough.
A fourth proposal is to modify the malpractice standard applied to
physicians. As explained below, this solution, in conjunction with
legislation aimed at protecting physicians from the unfairness of the
current scheme, is the most promising for several reasons.
VI.

PROPOSED SOLUTION - REFORM THROUGH THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION

The best overall solution to the policy problem is for the medical
profession to take the initiative and institute reforms in the way they
practice medicine such that they responsibly and effectively
incorporate considerations of cost into the treatment decision. By
doing this, the medical profession can gradually modify the legal
standard of care can so that a physician no longer faces or fears
liability if she does not do "everything" for a patient regardless of
cost. This approach does not require lowering the standard of care,
but rather makes the standard of care more reflective of the current
state of health care and matches the goals of health-care reform.
Additionally, a modified standard of care would work with targeted
314. See Hyman, supra note 122, at 304.
315. See id. Indeed, we are currently seeing the effects of increases in malpractice insurance as a
result of increased malpractice litigation and awards-physicians are leaving their practices because
they cannot afford the premiums.
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legislation to guarantee physicians fair treatment in their relationships
with MCOs, yet still encourage utility-maximizing practice styles.
While physicians would still face liability for treating a patient in a
manner that does not comport with acceptable medical practice, the
law would no longer pretend that costs should not be considered in
the treatment decision.
A. Policy Change Through the Profession

As discussed above, traditional ethical and legal requirements that
the physician put the individual patient first can no longer stand. 316
As an ethical matter, such policies have the effect of being
fundamentally unfair to physicians and, from a utilitarian perspective,
the costs far outweigh the benefits. Therefore, while it is clear that
physicians should not completely discard fiduciary duties to patients,
it is equally clear that the medical profession must alter its way of
doing business-no longer rejecting the notion of any type of bedside
rationing. 317 Although the medical culture surely cannot change
overnight, the profession can take concrete steps to effect a solution
to the policy problem outlined above. The first and most important
step is to begin altering the traditional meaning of the standard of
care.
The traditional notion of the standard of care rests on "patient first"
principles. While maintaining a standard that demands quality
medical treatment is important, this standard must no longer naively
require physician fidelity to the individual patient without any regard
to costs. Striking such a balance may seem difficult, but such a
solution is not out of reach. There are two possible options to
effectuate a change in the standard of care. The first is to pass
legislation that would incorporate cost into the standard of care?18
The broad principles that underlie the standard of care could change
to focus less on the individual patient, and instead provide that "care
would not be deemed necessary unless it had a high probability of
316. See MORREIM, supra note 15, at 86.
317. See id.
318. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1842.
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resulting in a substantial benefit to the patient.,,319 Legislation could
require physicians to balance a duty to society to control health-care
costs against the duty to the individual patient. 32o Finally, a
legislatively-created defense to a malpractice action could protect a
physician who treats a patient where there are insufficient resources
available to finance the recommended treatment. 321 The second
option is to allow the standard to evolve in the courtS. 322 This option
implies some evolution within the medical profession itself as the
standard of care is derived from the prevailing views of appropriate
practice by physicians themselves. 323
Putting the burden on and giving the power· to the medical
profession to address the policy problem makes sense for several
reasons. As an initial matter, an argument can be made that
physicians have a duty to participate in lowering the costs of health
care. This duty stems from the fact that the escalating costs of health
care in some measure are the result of the autonomy physicians have
enjoyed over the past several decades and the influence physicians
have had over the structure of health insurance and reimbursement. 324
Because physicians have, arguably, reaped substantial benefits from
the fee-for-service system, one could assert that they now must bear
some of the burdens of working toward a solution.
A second reason supporting a solution generated by the medical
profession is that, while recognizing that physicians have a duty to
work toward a solution, it also respects physicians' autonomy and
professional status. One of the main objections by physicians to
managed health care is that it erodes their autonomy with respect to
clinical matters. Leaving physicians to appropriately modify the
standard of care empowers them and moves their status from being
part of the problem to part of the solution. The profession will thus
"buy in" to the policy solution in a way that, clearly, they have not
319. [d.
320. See id. 1842-43.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. Hirshfeld. supra note 2, at

1845.
324. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 332 (Basic Books 1982).
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done with the externally-imposed rules of the government and
MCOs. This buy-in is important because physicians who feel that
third parties are inappropriately affecting their clinical decision
making may resort to deception to provide the care they think is in
their patients' best interests; they feel ethically and legally justified in
doing so. As discussed above, this "act utilitarianism" serves to
subvert the goals of health care cost containment and has significant
"rule" utilitarian effects.
Similarly, it is important to respect the profession and allow it to
redefine the goals of medical practice. These goals should not be
externally imposed, but should come from within, and can be a part
of a larger rethinking of the accepted aims of medical practice. As
stated by an international committee studying health-care reform,
"unless such an examination is carried out, and some new and better
ideals and directions formulated, the enterprise of medicine and the
health care systems of which it is a part will be . .. economically
unsustainable.,,325 One way to bridge the gap between the actions of
individual physicians on behalf of individual patients and the effects
on society is to empower physicians so they can make the necessary
changes to their pattern of practicing medicine.
Additionally, leaving the medical profession to modify the
standard of care is preferable because physicians are in the best
position to know what care is cost-effective and provides marginal
benefits in any given clinical situation. Moreover, because of their
specialized training, physicians can most effectively study and
evaluate treatments for cost-effectiveness and determine whether a
particular treatment is justified given its costs and expected benefits.
B. Modification Through Clinical Practice Guidelines

Once it is accepted that the medical profession is in the best
position to bring about a policy change to alleviate the effects of the
policy problem, the question becomes whether the profession in fact
has the tools to do so. Courts have long recognized that they do.
325.

THE GoALS OF MEDICINE: THE FORGOITEN IsSUE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

Hanson & Daniel Callahan eds., Georgetown University Press 1999).
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Courts defer to the medical profession to determine the appropriate
standard of care in .medical malpractice cases. 326 The standard
traditionally has been gleaned from a variety of sources, including
professional journals and conferences, as well as the "complex
interaction" of the members of the medical profession. 327 Over time,
the opinions and comments of members of the profession, if
accepted, grow into a "clinical policy," and then the standard of
care. 328 For any given medical problem, there is not merely one
correct standard of care. 329 Variations exist, and courts allow juries
to determine precisely which standard of those presented at trial
should govern in any particular case. 330 Cost can begin to become
part of the standard of care; one of the methods for incorporating
sensible cost considerations into the standard is through clinical
practice guidelines. 331
Simply stated, clinical practice guidelines, also referred to as
critical pathways, clinical practice protocols, and practice parameters,
are "sets of suggestions, described in decision rules, based on current
medical consensus about how to treat a certain illness or
condition.,,332 Such guidelines are meant to assist both the physician
and patient in making decisions about appropriate care in specific
ciicumstances. 333 Clinical practice guidelines have attracted attention
not just as a quality and cost control device, but also as a tool for
defining the appropriate standard of care in a malpractice case:

326. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Memitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1992).
327. Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should
Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 77 (2000).

They Constitute Conclusive

328. /d.
329. Id. at 78.
330. Barry R. Furrow, Imposing liability for the Undenreatment of Pain by Physicians, Hospitals,
Nursing Homes, and Managed Care Organizations, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28 (2001).
331. Id. at 32. This paper does not discuss the technical legal issues involving the weight, in a given
malpractice case, to be given to clinical practice guidelines, whether such guidelines should be

conclusive of the standard of care, and other related issues. This article assumes that such guidelines
would, at a minimum, be considered in determining the standard of care. See Arnold J. Rosoff, The
Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Refonn, 5HEALTH MATRIX 369, 390-91 (1995).
332. Furrow, supra note 330, at 32.
333. Finder, supra note 327, at 70.
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The development and proliferation of clinical practice guidelines
has speeded the process by which good evidence-based medical
practice becomes recognized and disseminated as such. In
response to the rapid growth in medical research and published
findings, these guidelines have become one of the transforming
forces in current medical practice.,,334
The medical profession has "expended substantial effort" on
developing practice guidelines, many of which have been produced
by medical specialty societies and individual medical centers. 335 In
the last ten years, the federal government has also sponsored efforts
to develop clinical practice guidelines through the Agency for
Healthcare Policy and Research (now known as the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, "AHRQ,,).336 Between 1992 and
1996, the agency sponsored the development of nineteen clinical
practice guidelines. 337 AHRQ maintains the National Guideline
Clearinghouse, which is a free, publicly available database of clinical
practice guidelines, produced in partnership with the American
Medical Association and the American Association of Health Plans.
"[T]he fact that they are· produced by national medical specialty
societies and the government means that they will be influential.,,338
Although critics label clinical practice guidelines as "cookbook"
medicine,339 in fact, studies have shown that they can be effective in
both improving health care quality and cutting costs. Studies have
also demonstrated that physicians, when properly trained in the use of
such guidelines and when audited for compliance, follow the
guidelines and believe they can be helpful. 340 Moreover, physicians
can use clinical practice guidelines to educate patients and involve
them in the effort to make sensible health care choices. Indeed,
334. Furrow, supra note 330, at 35.
335. [d. at 32, 35.
336. AHRQ Profile, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/aboutlprofile.htm.
337. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: Clinical Practice Guidelines Online, available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm.
338. Furrow, supra note 330, at 32.
339. Glenn Flores et aI., Pediatricians' Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices Regarding Clinical Practice
Guidelines: A National Survey, 105 PEDIATRICS No.3, 500 (Mar. 2000).
340. [d.

2003]

PHYSICIAN LIABILITY AND MANAGED CARE

699

patients rights advocates view guidelines as a means of improving
patient autonomy, made easier because the guidelines are available
online. 341
In a study published in the Journal of the American College of
Surgeons, researchers stated that, if adopted and practiced, clinical
practice guidelines "can improve performance and lower the cost of
health care by reducing provider variability and error and controlling
geographic practice patterns. [Clinical practice guidelines] have been
demonstrated to be effective in lowering costs and improving
outcomes in several surgical, medical, trauma, and ICU settings.,,342
Despite these results, the researchers found that variations in clinical
practice may still exist, in part due to the fact that, at many medical
centers, treatment orders are delegated to "junior members" of the
medical team who may order treatment that exceeds the requirements
of the guidelines. out of inexperience. 343 Likewise, more senior
physicians might over treat "out of rote.,,344 With respect to both the
less experienced physicians and the more senior physicians on staff,
the researchers found that a system that simply reminds physicians of
the guidelines and then audits for compliance yields a significantly
higher incidence of compliance with, and benefit from, the
guidelines. 345 In the study, compliance with the guidelines was 48%
before the institution of continuous surveillance by a nurse who was
trained as a clinical resource manager. 346 Compliance was 74% after
surveillance was instituted, with all deviations from the guidelines
deemed to be medically justified. 347
The researchers noted that for the two conditions studied, over a
two month period, the cost of "over" treatment due to noncompliance
with the guidelines was $22,760.35. The researchers concluded that,
with proper oversight, there was "a significant preliminary potential
341. See Finder, supra note 327, at 71; Furrow, supra note 330, at 33.
342. Heidi L. Frankel et al., Strategies to Improve Compliance with Evidence-Based Clinical
Management Guidelines, 189 I. AM. SURG. 533 (1999).
.
343. Id. at 533.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Frankel et al., supra note 342, at 533.
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for cost savings" with clinical management guidelines. 348 Indeed,
specific estimates found in the guidelines themselves support this
conclusion. For instance, in a clinical practice guideline dealing with
the treatment of pressure ulcers, the authors explain that in economic
terms, the reported cost of pressure ulcer treatment can vary greatly.
The guideline estimates that the total national cost of pressure ulcer
treatment exceeds $1.335 billion.
Implementation of the
recommendations is estimated to reduce the cost of pressure ulcer
treatment by 3% or $40 million?49
Through the use of clinical practice guidelines, cost considerations
can become a legitimate component of the standard of care for
several reasons. First, the guidelines will help minimize wasteful or
unnecessary care as well as treatment variations based on little more
than geographic location of the physician and patient. Second, the
guidelines will alert physicians to treatment patterns that are most
cost-effective or that represent the greatest cost benefit in any given
situation. With appropriate institutional and professional oversight
and incorporation into medical education, physicians can therefore
learn to practice more cost-effective medicine, and do so in a way
that avoids haphazard, forced rationing.
Finally, making cost a legitimate component of the treatment
decision will serve to lessen the chance that an MCO would deselect
or terminate a physician from a plan for practicing medicine in too
costly a manner. To the extent MCOs still threatened termination or
imposed unreasonable cost limitations, targeted legislation like that
discussed above would work hand-in-hand with a new standard of
care to protect the physician while encouraging more cost-efficient
medical practice.
Critics may argue that the proposal to change the governing
standard of care to allow for considerations of cost in the treatment
decision sanctions bedside rationing. Critics point out that such
rationing is not legitimate because it places physicians in an ethical
348. [d. at 537.
349. Pressure Ulcer Clinical Practice Guideline. available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm.
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dilemma-pitting patient needs against treatment costS. 350 They
argue that rationing must move away from the bedside and into
public view as part of the democratic process. 351 In this way,
rationing choices are open to debate, and physicians can establish
clear guidelines. 352 Such guidelines would free the physician from
having to make these choices and would involve individual patients·
in making the difficult decisions. 353 Moreover, critics argue that
bedside rationing can be haphazard and even discriminatory.354
Yet under the policy solution advocated here, bedside rationing
need not be as ethically deficient as critics argue. First, despite the
fear that such rationing will pit physicians against patients and erode
the trust patients have in their physicians, this is not necessarily the
case. Physicians are still "one of the most highly trusted professional
groupS.,,355 Indeed, when faced with the fact that rationing in some
way must be a part of modem health care, most patients would prefer
that their physician, whom they trust, do the rationing, as opposed to
MCOs or government organizations. 356 Additionally, some such
rationing already takes place in health c~e?57 Giving it a scientific
basis and bringing it out into the open will likely lend the practice
credibility and ultimately serve to enhance the trust already present in
the physician-patient relationship.358
Second, such rationing decisions, although made at the bedside,
would be more open than they are today. Changes to the standard of
care would require changes within the medical community, beginning
with the way we educate physicians. Physicians would have an
opportunity to participate in crafting suggested practice guidelines
and could then discuss openly with their patients the efficacy of
treatments in light of their cost. With the availability and usefulness
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

See UBEL, supra note 46, at 137.
See WONG, supra note 14, at 45.
See id.
See id.
See UBEL, supra note 46, at 139-41.
[d. at 139.
[d. at 140.
[d. at 140.
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of clinical practice guidelines in educating and informing patients,
bedside rationing need not be a secretive, illegitimate practice as it
traditionally has been viewed. Additionally, bedside rationing, under
the solution envisioned here, would not be as haphazard or
discriminatory as imagined. Through the use of clinical practice
guidelines, with appropriate oversight as necessary, physicians would
achieve bedside rationing in an even-handed and more scientificallysupported way. Moreover, a broadening of the standard of care to
encompass cost considerations, with the use of practice guidelines,
would best succeed if the principles were a part of medical education
and training. Therefore, once they reached practice, physicians would
be properly equipped to make responsible bedside rationing
decisions. Bedside rationing has two moral strengths.359 It is
"indispensable" in that reducing the costs of health care cannot be
achieved without the efforts of physicians, and it allows health care to
be rationed in a way that accounts for individual patient needs in
unique clinical settings. 360
Finally, some sanctioning of bedside rationing and modification of
the standard of care need not and should not mean the elimination of
all liability for physicians, nor must it weaken important ethical
duties with which we are comfortable. It is possible to preserve some
of the most important benefits of the current liability framework
while mitigating its unfairness and minimizing the costs. Because
modifying the current standard of care leaves in place traditional
liability principles, the solution proposed here provides a realistic and
more incremental approach to resolving the policy problem.
CONCLUSION

As explained above, the policy problem is one with deep roots in
our legal, medical, and popular culture. Its ethical complexity
illustrates that a simple, politically popular legislative fix, whether in
the form of targeted state or federal legislation or a "Patients Bill of
359. Id.
360. UBEL, supra note 46, at 147.
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Rights," may be necessary, but not enough, for an optimal solution.
The optimal solution must include an initiative from the medical
profession to responsibly embrace cost considerations that temper the
"patient first" ethic with utility-maximizing practice patterns. A new
standard of care coupled with state or federal legislation that protects
the physician from the unfairness of the current policy (such as
legislation preventing termination from an MCO where the MCO's
cost-containment goals exceed a new, cost-conscious standard of
care) can go a long way toward solving the policy problem. In this
way, legislation that might otherwise have perpetuated the costescalating style of medical practice can work hand-in-hand with the
medical profession to produce the cultural changes that health care
desperately needs.
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